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Abstract A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe ‘knowledge’ can
be influenced by practical  factors.  For  revisionary proposals,  they indicate  that  the  truth-
values of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on
the  contrary,  nothing  surprising  is  happening.  Standard  pragmatic  approaches  appeal  to
pragmatic  implicatures  and  psychological  approaches  to  the  idea  that  belief  formation  is
influenced  by  practical  factors.  Conservative  proposals  have  not  yet  offered  a  fully
satisfactory explanation, though. In this paper, I introduce and defend a third conservative
proposal which I call ‘Refined Invariantism’. The two main claims of this proposal are that
(1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe
(that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the
target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of
case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and
action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main
pitfalls  of its two conservative rivals and that it  gives new life to the generality objection
leveled against revisionary views.
1. Introduction
A certain number of cases discussed in the philosophical literature show that our willingness
to ascribe or deny ‘knowledge’ can be influenced by practical factors (such as the cost of
being wrong). Here are what are probably the best-known cases, proposed by Keith DeRose
(1992: 913):
Bank Case A (LOW). My wife and I are driving home on a Friday after
noon. We plan  to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our
paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside
are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although we
generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not
especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I
suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on
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Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybe the bank won't be open
tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know
it’ll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It's open until
noon.”
Bank Case B (HIGH). My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday after
noon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit
our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on
Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until
noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and very important
check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before
Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in
a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife
reminds me of these facts. She then says, “Banks do change their hours.
Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as confident as
I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no. I’d
better go in and make sure.”
While it seems appropriate for Keith to assert ‘I know that the bank will be open tomorrow’ in
LOW, it also seems appropriate for him to assert ‘I don’t know that the bank will be open
tomorrow’ in HIGH. Yet, LOW and HIGH differ only in the two following ways. First, it is
very important for Keith and his wife that they deposit their paychecks on or before Saturday
in HIGH, but that’s not important in LOW. Second, Keith’s wife makes salient a possibility of
error in HIGH which is not salient in LOW. 
Philosophers  have  offered  very  different  diagnoses  about  these  cases.  According  to
revisionary  proposals  we  should  grant  the  surprising  claim  that  the  truth-values  of
‘knowledge’  ascriptions  and  denials  are  determined  by  practical  factors.  The  two  main
revisionary  proposals  are  Epistemic  Contextualism  –  the  view  according  to  which  the
meaning of ‘know’ is sensitive to what is practically at stake (among other things) – and
Subject-Sensitive Invariantism – the view according to which there is a practical condition on
knowledge, e.g. that S knows that p only if it is rational for S to act as if p.1 If this kind of
view is correct, we can say that Keith says something true when he says ‘I know that the bank
1 Contextualism is  defended in particular  by Cohen (1999),  DeRose  (1992;  2009),  Blome-Tilmann (2014),
Ichikawa (2017), and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism by Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005), Fantl and McGrath
(2009). A third revisionary proposal is relativism, which is defended by McFarlane (2011).
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will be open’ in LOW, and that he says something true when he says ‘I do not know that the
bank will be open’ in HIGH.
On the other hand, standard conservative (non-sceptical) approaches have proposed two other
diagnoses.2 According to standard pragmatic approaches, Keith says something true when he
says ‘I know that the bank will be open’ in LOW, and he says something false when he says ‘I
do not  know that  the bank will  be open’  in  HIGH, but  asserting  this  literal  falsehood is
appropriate due to a pragmatic implicature.3 
According to psychological approaches, Keith says something true when he says ‘I know that
the bank will be open’ in LOW and he says something true when he says ‘I do not know that
the bank will be open’ in HIGH. But this is explained by the very plausible assumption that
practical factors influence knowledge and belief indirectly by influencing the belief forming
mechanisms. In particular, when high stakes or possibilities of error are perceived, it becomes
more difficult to form a settled belief. We can then say that Keith does not know in HIGH
because he does not believe the target proposition (in the sense relevant for knowledge), and
that he does not believe this proposition because his belief forming mechanisms are somewhat
affected by the consideration of the possibility of error and the stakes.4
It is worth emphasizing how the two conservative approaches differ. In focusing exclusively
on what is appropriate for Keith to say in HIGH, standard pragmatic approaches implicitly
suggest that being in a high stakes situation is not particularly relevant to whether Keith can
know the target  proposition.  In focusing exclusively on whether  Keith believes  the target
proposition  in  HIGH,  psychological  approaches  share  with  revisionary  approaches  the
supposition that being in a high stakes situation is crucial to whether one can know the target
proposition (even if these approaches differ on how and why that is the case).
In this paper, I focus on the main conservative proposals. I explain why they seem ultimately
unsatisfactory. However, the consideration of their limits will suggest a new view which I call
‘Refined Invariantism’. This view takes seriously the distinction between high stakes cases in
which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and high stakes cases
in which the subject believes (that he knows) the target proposition. Its core insight is that two
2 In this discussion, a view is classified as ‘non-sceptical’ if it maintains that Keith knows in LOW. For sceptical
approaches to the problem, see Davis (2007) and Fassio (forth.). I will leave these approaches aside.
3 Advocates  of  standard  pragmatic  approaches  include Rysiew (2001;  2005;  2007),  Brown (2006),  Hazlett
(2009), Pritchard (2010), Lutz (2014) and Gerken (2017).
4 For psychological approaches, see Bach (2005; 2008; 2010), Williamson (2005), Nagel (2008, 2010a, 2010b),
Engel (2009).
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different  explanations  should  be  given  for  these  two  different  cases:  a  psychological
explanation for the first kind of case and a non-standard pragmatic explanation appealing to
the epistemic standards of appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. As we
will see, this new conservative approach gives new life to the generality objection which has
been raised against revisionary views, in particular against epistemic contextualism. It also
avoids the pitfalls of rival conservative approaches.
My plan is as follows. In section 2, I consider the standard pragmatic approaches. In section 3,
I consider the two main psychological approaches. In section 4, I propose and defend my new
conservative approach.
2.  Standard pragmatic approaches
In general, pragmatic approaches seek to explain the variability exhibited in cases like LOW
and  HIGH  by  focusing  on  potential  pragmatic  effects  of  ‘knowledge’  attributions  (and
denials). In this section, I consider the  standard  pragmatic approaches. I briefly review the
five main pressing problems that they face. 
According to standard pragmatic approaches, Keith says something true when he says ‘I know
that the bank will be open’ in LOW and he says something false when he says ‘I do not know
that the bank will be open’ in HIGH. However, we are told, asserting this literal falsehood in
HIGH is appropriate for this generates an implicature which is appropriate and true. For some
writers, what is implicated is that Keith is not in a position to eliminate the salient alternative
that the bank has changed its hours.5 For other theorists, what is implicated is that Keith is not
in a position to act on the proposition that the bank is open.6 Yet other philosophers think that
what is implicated is a recommendation not to come back but to rather deposit the pay check
right now.7 In addition, standard pragmatic approaches maintain that it would be inappropriate
although  true  for  Keith  in  HIGH to  say  ‘I  know that  the  bank  is  open’,  for  this  would
pragmatically communicate something inappropriate and false (for example, that Keith is in a
good enough epistemic position to act on the target proposition).
These  pragmatic  approaches  rely  on  the  distinction  between  the  literal  meaning  of  an
utterance (“what is said”) and its pragmatic meaning (“what is conveyed”). To illustrate this
distinction, suppose I ask you whether John is a good philosopher and you tell me that he has
5 See Rysiew (2001).
6 See Brown (2006).
7 See Gerken (2017).
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good  handwriting.  I  will  presumably  conclude  that  you  don’t  think  John  is  a  good
philosopher.  Although  that’s  not  what  you  literally  say,  that’s  what  you  pragmatically
communicate.  Following  Grice  (1989),  we  can  understand  the  pragmatic  meaning  of  an
utterance as what is conveyed by this utterance in virtue of the literal meaning of the uttered
sentence,  the  context  (including  the  common  background  knowledge)  and  general
conversational rules.
The distinction between pragmatic and semantic meaning seems clear, but many critics have
put forth reasons to doubt that it can be put to work to provide an adequate explanation of the
bank cases. Let us begin by clarifying what the explanatory challenge about the bank cases is
supposed to be. 
As said above, it seems that:
(1) Keith’s ‘knowledge’ denial is appropriate in HIGH.
It also seems that:
(2) Keith’s ‘knowledge’ ascription is inappropriate in HIGH.
Further, many philosophers (but not all) accept that: 
(3) Keith’s ‘knowledge’ denial seems true in HIGH.
(4) Keith’s ‘knowledge’ ascription seems false in HIGH.
Finally, virtually everyone accepts that:
(5) Keith can rationally act on the proposition that the bank is open in LOW.
(6) Keith cannot rationally act on the proposition that the bank is open in HIGH.
Advocates of standard pragmatic approaches can easily explain claims (5) and (6) if they deny
that knowledge is the norm of action and if they opt for a variable epistemic norm instead.8
On this  view,  in  LOW, Keith  satisfies  the  epistemic  norm for  appropriate  action  on  the
proposition that the bank is open, whereas, in HIGH, Keith does not satisfy this epistemic
norm.  Claims  (5)  and (6)  do not  seem to pose a  special  problem for  standard  pragmatic
approaches.
Claims (3) and (4) are  more controversial  than claims  (1) and (2).  They are accepted  by
prominent  proponents of standard pragmatic  approaches.9 It  seems clear,  at  least,  that  the
attraction of these pragmatic approaches will be considerably weakened if they cannot explain
(3) and (4), for it seems somewhat difficult to deny these intuitions.10
8 For such proposals, see among others Brown (2008); Levin (2008); Locke (2015); Gerken (2017).
9 For example, Brown (2006: 410). 
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Although initially promising, standard pragmatic approaches encounter at least five pressing
problems.  The  first  problem  concerns  (3)  and  (4).  Advocates  of  standard  pragmatic
approaches must  argue that literally false assertions (e.g. “I do not know that the bank is
open”) may seem true in virtue of true implicatures (e.g. “I’m not in a good enough epistemic
position to act”) and that literally true assertions (e.g. “I know that the bank is open”) can
seem false in virtue of false implicatures (e.g. “I’m in a good enough epistemic position to
act”).11 Although advocates of standard pragmatic approaches often claim that we sometimes
confuse the pragmatic and the semantic meaning, or that we often directly and exclusively
focus on the pragmatic meaning,12 that does not seem to be what happens for most cases of
implicatures.13 There  might  be some cases in  which false  implicatures  make literally  true
utterances appear false, but proponents of standard pragmatic approaches must still provide an
explanation  of  why that  should  be  the  case  when it  comes  to  implicatures  generated  by
‘knowledge’ ascriptions (and denials).14 Call this problem the ‘apparent truth-value problem’.
A second pressing problem concerns  (1).  According to  standard pragmatic  proposals,  it’s
appropriate for Keith to say something false (‘I do not know’) in HIGH in order to convey
something true (e.g. that he is not in a good enough epistemic position to act). But, in general,
it is doubtful that it can be appropriate to say (and convey) something false in order to convey
10 See Dinges (2018: sect. 3). Dimmock and Huvenes (2014: fn 6) grant that we might want to reject (4) and
Hazlett (2009:  612), Pritchard (2010: 88) and Lutz (2014) reject (3). As we will see in section 4, a crucial claim
of the proposal defended in this paper is that we should draw a distinction between two kinds of high stakes
cases: one in which the subject confidently believes (that he knows) the target proposition, and one in which the
subject does not confidently believe (that he knows) the target proposition. This approach can explain why we
may have divergent intuitions about what seems true or false in HIGH, which I take to be a point in favour of the
proposed approach.
11 See Dinges (2018: sect. 1).
12 See, e.g., Rysiew (2001: 486-487; 2007: 640), Brown (2006: 428) and Hazlett (2009: 610).
13 Dinges (2018: sect. 3) shows that this is not what happens at least in most cases of “additive” implicatures, in
which what is conveyed is the literal  meaning plus the implicatures (like in Grice’s  famous petrol  case).  In
particular, if the apparent truth-value is the result of the truth-value of the literal meaning in addition to the truth-
value of the semantic meaning, (additive) true implicatures cannot make a literally false claim appear true, since
the global seeming truth-value will be the falsity. Further, Dinges (2018) argues that if there is an implicature in
the bank cases, it is additive and not “substitutional” (what is conveyed is not merely the pragmatic meaning but
also the semantic meaning of the utterance). Substitutional implicatures require that, given the common ground,
what  is  said  is  incompatible  with  the  speaker  being  seen  as  observing  (or  trying  to  observe)  the  general
conversational rules. In the bank cases, given the common ground (and supposing that Keith’s wife does not
know about Keith’s evidence) what Keith says (‘I know that p’ or ‘I do not know that p’) will be compatible with
Keith observing or trying to observe the general conversational rules. It follows that no substitutional implicature
is involved in the bank cases. 
14 See Fantl and McGrath (2009:  42). 
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something true, for it seems clear that we should not tell falsehoods.15 There might be some
cases in which it’s appropriate to tell a white lie, but it’s hard to see why that would be the
case in HIGH.16 Call this problem the ‘inappropriate falsehood problem’.
A  third  problem  points  to  the  way  in  which  one  is  willing  to  retract  one’s  previous
‘knowledge’ assertion when the context changes. Suppose that, in LOW, Keith utters ‘I know
that the bank is open’. Suppose, however, that Keith’s practical situation changes. Keith is
now in HIGH, and he then utters ‘I do not know that the bank is open’. Suppose someone
challenges his new assertion by saying “But you said you knew that the bank is open!” A
natural reaction for Keith is to retract his former assertion that he knows. But that is most
unexpected  if  his  assertion  was  true  and  appropriate.  Further,  we  do  not  find  similar
retractions when it comes to other kinds of pragmatic implicatures.17 Call this problem the
‘retraction problem’.
Fourth, standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures. One crucial feature
of pragmatic implicatures is that they are cancelable.18 However, the assumed implicature in
HIGH does not seem cancelable. For example, it seems that, in HIGH, an utterance by Keith
of ‘I know that the bank will be open but I cannot eliminate the possibility that it has changed
its hours’ or ‘I know that the bank will be open but we should check’ seems incoherent (see
Cohen 1999: 60). Although advocates of standard pragmatic approaches have tried to explain
why the supposed implicature seems difficult, if not impossible, to cancel, we typically do not
find  a  similar  phenomenon  with  other  uncontroversial  implicatures.19 For  example,  some
writers have proposed to say that the implicature in question is nearly universal. But other
15 DeRose (2009: 114, 124).
16 See Fant and McGrath (2009: 41-42).
17 See Dimmock and Huvenes (2014: sect. 4).
18 See Grice (1989: 44), Levinson (1983: 114).
19 See Dimmock and Huvenes (2014). I should note that although I agree with Dimmock and Huvenes that there
is a strong feeling of incoherence when the ‘knowledge’ ascription is made in the first person, it seems to me that
this feeling disappears when it comes to the third person version. At least, it seems that an utterance of ‘Keith
knows that the bank is open, but he need to investigate further’ sounds much less incoherent than an utterance
of ‘I know that the bank is open but I need to investigate further’ (see also Stanley 2008: 40). In section 4 below,
I explain the infelicity of the first-person version on the basis of the infelicity of uttering ‘p but I should check
whether p’ and the fact that knowledge is factive. 
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nearly universal  implicatures  do not  seem that  difficult  to  cancel.20 Call  this  problem the
‘cancelability problem’.
Finally, any proposed pragmatic approach must appeal to a general rule explaining how the
implicature  is  calculated.21 Most  accounts  invoke  the  rule  of  relevance,  but  that  seems
unsatisfactory.22 For one thing, it appears that the semantic content of Keith’s ‘knowledge’
denial in HIGH  is relevant. For if more than knowledge is required in HIGH, the fact that
Keith does not know directly settles the issue. But, if so, that’s not the irrelevance of the
semantic  content  which  can  lead  the  hearer  toward  the  pragmatic  content.  The  rule  of
relevance misses the mark. For another, assuming that knowledge is not always sufficient for
action and that more than knowledge is required in HIGH, we still lack an explanation why
Keith’s  ‘knowledge’  ascription  in  HIGH is  bound to generate  the  (false)  implicature  that
Keith is in a good enough epistemic position to act, rather than the (true) implicature that he is
not in a good enough  epistemic position to act. In general, there is no reason to think that
asserting that we satisfy epistemic standards weaker than the ones required in the situation is
bound to communicate that we satisfy these higher epistemic standards. For example, suppose
that knowledge that p is required in some context C. An utterance of ‘I’ve reasons to believe
that p’ in C, literally expressing that we satisfy epistemic standards weaker than knowledge,
does not generate an implicature that our epistemic position is good enough and satisfies the
standards for knowledge. Rather, it precisely communicates that our epistemic position is not
good enough and does not satisfy the standards for knowledge. This is entirely as we should
expect  given  the  rule  of  quantity  (assert  the  stronger!).  This  observation  shows  that  the
approach  under  consideration  still  needs  to  provide  an  explanation  why  a  ‘knowledge’
ascription in HIGH is bound to generate an implicature that an epistemic position stronger
than knowledge is satisfied. Call this problem the ‘calculability problem’.23
To sum up, standard pragmatic approaches face five pressing problems: the apparent truth-
value problem, the inappropriate falsehood problem, the retraction problem, the cancelability
20 See Rysiew (2001: 496; 2007: 646) for this proposal and Dimmock and Huvenes (2014) for the reply. Brown
(2006) notes that some implicitures are not easily cancelable. But, first, note that it is unclear that implicitures
should be understood in pragmatic terms and, second, implicitures are not additive. If the supposed implicature
in HIGH is additive, it is not similar to an impliciture. See Dinges (2018).
21 See DeRose (2009: chap. 3).
22 Appeals to the rule of relevance are made in particular by Rysiew (2001; 2005; 2007), Brown (2006), Hazlett
(2009). 
23 See Dimmock and Huvenes (2014).  Gerken (2017) proposes to explain the alleged pragmatic implicatures
associated with ‘knowledge’ ascriptions and denials in terms of a heuristic associated with knowledge-based
assessments. For criticisms, see Vollet (2018).
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problem, and the calculability problem. These problems raise serious doubts as to whether
standard  pragmatic  approaches  can  succeed.  We  might  think,  then,  that  psychological
approaches are more promising. However, as I will now explain, psychological approaches
face problems of their own.
3. Psychological approaches
In general, psychological approaches seek to explain the variability exhibited in cases like
LOW and  HIGH by focusing  on whether  the  subject  believes (in  the  sense  relevant  for
knowledge)  the target  proposition.  In  this  section,  I  consider  the two main  psychological
approaches. I highlight the main problems they face,  some already noted in the literature,
some others new. 
According  to  psychological  approaches,  Keith  does  not  know  in  HIGH  because,  due  to
psychological factors, his belief (in the sense required for knowledge) is not formed. This
should not strike us as particularly surprising, after all. In HIGH, Keith perceives a possibility
of error and high stakes. It’s an empirically well-established fact that perceiving a possibility
of  error  and  high  stakes  normally  affects  the  formation  of  belief.24 In  most  views  of
knowledge,  knowledge  requires  a  settled  or  outright  belief.  As  a  result,  psychological
approaches can easily grant and explain claims (1)-(4) above. If Keith does not believe the
target proposition in HIGH (at least  in the sense required for knowledge),  Keith does not
know  in  HIGH.  Therefore,  Keith’s  ‘knowledge’  denial  is  true  and  appropriate;  Keith’s
‘knowledge’ ascription would be false and inappropriate and Keith’s ‘knowledge’ ascriptions
and denial just seem to have the truth-value that they have in fact.
Regarding (5) and (6), it  may at first seem that since psychological approaches grant that
Keith knows that the bank is open in LOW, while he does not know that the bank is open in
HIGH, they can accept knowledge norms for assertion and action.25 Indeed, it’s rational for
Keith to act on and assert the target proposition in LOW, where he knows, but not in HIGH,
where he does not know. As we will see, though, things are slightly more complicated.
In  order  to  assess  psychological  approaches,  it  is  useful  to  distinguish  a  simple  and  a
sophisticated version. According to the simple version:
24 See in particular Hawthorne (2004: 164), Williamson (2005: 226; 234-235), Nagel (2008; 2010a, 2010b) and
the references they quote.
25 It looks as though Nagel’s approach tries to remain as neutral as possible on the issue of epistemic norms of
assertion and action.
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Psychological approach (simple) In HIGH, the subject’s belief is not formed, but the
subject could have formed a justified belief and had knowledge.
According to the sophisticated version:
Psychological approach (sophisticated) In HIGH, the subject’s belief is not formed.
If we assume, however, that his belief  is formed in these circumstances,  and given
natural psychological assumptions about normal subjects, we should expect his belief
to be ill-based, and therefore unjustified.
The simple version has been defended by Bach and the sophisticated version by Nagel.26 I will
consider their proposals in turn. As we will see, the major problem of these proposals is that
they  are  insufficiently  general.  We  can  design  cases  in  which  they  offer  no  adequate
explanation.  In  addition,  although  more  general,  Nagel’s  approach  faces  further  specific
problems. 
3.1 The simple psychological approach 
Bach’s view can be captured by the following claims:
1. High stakes related to p provide (normative practical) reasons to consider further
possibilities of error and not to act as if p, i.e. not to close the issue.27
2. Not closing the issue (tends to) raises the threshold for confident belief, and makes
it more difficult for the subject to form or maintain a confident belief that p.28
26 Some authors take Nagel’s view to be revisionary, thereby suggesting that, on her view, the (perceived) level
of  stakes  is  constitutively  or  conceptually  related  to  the  epistemic  standards  required  by  knowledge  and
epistemic justification  (see,  e.g.,  Sripada  and Stanley 2012:  §4).  However,  as  made clear  in  Psychological
approach  (sophisticated),  and  explained  in  further  details  below,  Nagel’s  view does  not  add  a  necessary
condition on knowledge or epistemic justification beyond those already recognized by conservative approaches.
Her view is perfectly compatible  with  the conservative claim that if two subjects S1 and S2 have the same
evidence E and believe that p on the basis of E in the same way, then S1 is justified or knows that p if and only if
S2 is justified or knows that p (no matter the respective practical situations of S1 and S2). However, Nagel points
out that, as a matter of fact, a normal person is not disposed to believe  in the same way when aware that the
stakes are high. Perceived stakes have a causal relevance for belief formation. 
27 Bach (2008: 83): “Since the size of the stakes increases the cost of being wrong, it also increases the range of
possibilities  one  should  guard  against  (…)  One’s  practical  reasons  give  one  reason  not  to  treat  certain
possibilities as closed, hence not to act as if they do not obtain” (my emphasis). See also Bach (2005: 77).
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3. Therefore high stakes related to p influence the formation or retention of the belief
and knowledge that p.29
This approach has it that, in HIGH, Keith is somewhat mistaken about the strength or scope of
his epistemic position. He implicitly thinks his evidence is insufficient to know the target
proposition, and that his belief would be unjustified, whereas, actually, it would be justified.
The evidence is only insufficient to act on the target proposition.  In High, Keith displays
“excessive epistemic caution” (Bach 2010: 117; My emphasis). 
If  Bach  is  right  that  in  high  stakes  contexts  beliefs  are  typically  not  formed  because
possibilities of error which are merely practically relevant (i.e. relevant for justified actions)
are  implicitly  or  automatically  treated  as  epistemically relevant  (i.e.  relevant  for  justified
beliefs), it should be possible on reflection to correct this mistake and to maintain a confident
belief  while  considering  further  possibilities  of  error.  At  least,  we  could  imagine  people
susceptible  of  maintaining  their  confident  belief  and their  knowledge while  (for  practical
reasons) they leave open certain possibilities of error. On this view, excluding the possibility
of error is at most a psychological precondition (or an enabling condition) for meeting the
threshold  for  confident  belief.  That’s  not  an  essential  condition  for  confident  belief  and
knowledge.30
28 Bach (2008: 83): “One’s practical interest explains the rise in the threshold of confident, settled belief, and
thoughts of counterpossibilities make it more difficult for this threshold to be crossed” (my emphasis). See also
(2005: 77): “One’s threshold for (confidently) believing a proposition is a matter of what one implicitly takes to
be sufficient reason to believe it (...) Even if in fact one is in a position to know something, thinking one is not in
a position to know it is enough to keep one from believing it (at least not without reservations) and to lead one, if
it matters enough, to look into it further (…) However, it does not follow that the standards of knowledge go up
(or that the threshold of justification is higher or that the range of relevant alternatives to be ruled out is wider).”
See also Bach (2005, 30); (2010, 117-118).
29 Bach (2008: 83): “[T]he higher stakes raise the threshold of confident, doubt-free belief (…). Lack of doubt-
free belief keeps one from meeting the doxastic condition on knowledge.” See also Bach (2005: 52, 77, 81).
30 According to a pragmatist interpretation of Bach, closing the issue is essential to believing confidently: there 
are normative practical reasons (not) to believe which explain why a settled belief is pragmatically unjustified in 
the high stakes situation under consideration. While this interpretation has some appeal, it does not fit well with 
other claims made by Bach. For example, Bach writes (2010: 118) “A different situation arises if you do have a 
settled and confident belief that p. Even then, given the cost of being wrong you may think that you need to 
make sure that p, by ruling out certain possibilities of error that ordinarily would be too remote even to consider, 
much less bother with.” It’s clear, then, that on Bach’s view it’s perfectly possible to have a settled belief and yet
consider further possibilities of error. Bach (2008: 83) also writes that when the stakes are raised “One’s 
practical interest explains the rise in the threshold of confident, settled belief, and thoughts of counterpossibilities
make it more difficult for this threshold to be crossed” (my emphasis). On his view, not closing the issue makes 
it more difficult to form a settled belief, but that does not thereby make that impossible. In addition, it can be 
granted that practical interests explain the rise in threshold without granting that this rise is pragmatically 
justified. To be sure, Bach (2010: 117) writes that the caution that one manifests in high stakes situations, and 
which can lead us to manifest excessive epistemic caution, “has a practical rationale and is therefore not 
irrational”. But that does not imply that a settled belief can be justified or unjustified by practical reasons. It 
would only if Bach also assumed that believing confidently necessarily required closing the issue. Be that as it 
may, the pragmatist interpretation does not undermine what I say below.
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If so, Bach’s proposal is obviously not friendly to knowledge or justified belief norms, for it
allows possible high stakes cases in which the subject believes and knows that p, but without
granting that in these situations it’s rational for the subject to act on p. If some (epistemic)
reasons can be sufficient to justify a confident belief that p, while they are still insufficient to
justify closing the issue about p and acting on p, then knowledge, or justified belief, is not the
epistemic norm of action. 
I think Bach’s approach is very plausible when it comes to dealing with HIGH. However,
there are also third-person cases to consider, like Cohen’s airport case:
AIRPORT. Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating taking a certain flight
to New York. They want to know whether the flight has a layover in Chicago. They
overhear  someone  ask  a  passenger  Smith  if  he  knows whether  the  flight  stops  in
Chicago. Smith looks at the flight itinerary he got from the travel agent and responds
“Yes I know it does stop in Chicago.” It turns out that Mary and John have a very
important business contact they have to make at the Chicago airport. Mary says, “How
reliable is that itinerary?  It could contain a misprint.  They could have changed the
schedule at the last minute.” Mary and John agree that Smith doesn’t really know that
the plane will stop in Chicago. They decide to check with the airline agent. (Cohen,
1999: 58)
In this case, Mary and John seem to appropriately deny ‘knowledge’.  They are in a high
stakes  situation,  and  they  are  assessing  Smith,  a  low  stakes  subject  who,  they  know,
confidently  believes  the  proposition  on  the  basis  of  some  evidence.  Mary  and  John’s
intuitively appropriate (although arguably false) assertion that Smith does not know cannot be
explained by appealing to the idea that Smith is seen as not confidently believing the target
proposition. And if Smith’s evidence is sufficient to justify his belief, Smith knows. How can
Bach’s approach explain this case?
The attributors  are  in  a  high  stakes  situation.  If  Bach’s  approach is  correct,  they  do not
confidently believe the target proposition. But when we do not confidently believe that p, we
cannot  coherently  think  that  someone  else  knows that  p.  It  is  then  incoherent  to  ascribe
‘knowledge that p’ to this person:
Belief condition on coherent ‘knowledge’ ascriptions (BCKA) If you do not believe
that p (in the sense relevant for knowledge) it’s incoherent to ascribe ‘knowledge’ that
p to others.
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BCKA is a very plausible claim, and it explains the intuitive appropriateness of Mary and
John’s (false) claim that Smith does not know.
However, what about cases in which both the attributor and the subject confidently believe the
proposition? Modify AIRPORT and assume that Mary has double-checked:
AIRPORT – GOOD EVIDENCE. Mary and John have now checked with the airline
agent.  Mary’s  son,  Bob,  was  with  Mary  and  John  when  they  overheard  Smith’s
assertion. However, Bob didn’t hear the ensuing discussion between Mary and John.
Puzzled by the fact that they have double-checked with the airline agent, Bob asks:
“But why did you ask the airline agent? Didn’t you hear this passenger, Smith, saying
that the flight stops in Chicago?” Mary replies “Yes but he didn’t really know. The
itinerary could have contained a misprint or they could have changed the schedule at
the last minute.”
Mary now has more information. She confidently believes that the flight stops in Chicago.
Mary’s assertion may seem appropriate (even if false) but BCKA cannot explain that. Still,
Bach may appeal to the idea that Mary is biased or mistaken about the threshold required for
epistemic  justification.  Her  threshold for believing is  still  high (what  she takes  to  be the
epistemic standard for knowledge is still too high) and she wrongly takes Smith’s evidence to
be insufficient for knowledge. 
Bach’s approach provides a very plausible explanation for HIGH, AIRPORT, AIRPORT –
GOOD EVIDENCE.  However,  crucially,  it  fails  to  account  for  a  different  type  of  case.
Consider:
CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES SUBJECT. We have a paycheck to deposit at the bank.
We arrive at the bank, and we see the long line. We overhear Keith saying that the
bank was open on Saturday two weeks ago. We are in a low stakes situation and our
belief threshold is normal. You tell me “If the bank was open on Saturday two weeks
ago,  it’s  open  on  Saturdays.  It  will  be  open  tomorrow”.  I  agree  and,  confidently
believing that the bank will be open, we decide to come back tomorrow. Just before
leaving, however, we learn about Keith’s high stakes situation and we overhear that he
replies to his wife, who has mentioned the possibility that the bank will be closed,
“No. I know that the bank will be open.” Puzzled by Keith’s assertion, I tell you “He
should not say that”. 
It seems to me that you should agree that Keith should not assert ‘I know that the bank will be
open  tomorrow’.  However,  in  the  situation  under  consideration,  it’s  clear  that  we  (the
assessors) and Keith (the attributor and the subject) confidently believe the target proposition
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on the basis of evidence supposedly sufficient to know. If, in this situation, we judge that
confident high stakes Keith should not say that he knows, that’s not because we think that
Keith does not confidently believe the proposition.
Although Bach’s approach seems to be on the right track, it is insufficiently general. It cannot
explain  cases  where  it  is  stipulated  that  the  assessor,  the  attributor  and  the  subject  all
confidently believe the target proposition on the basis of what is supposed to be knowledge-
level evidence and where, intuitively,  the high stakes subject / attributor should not say ‘I
know that p’. As I will explain in section 4, we need a pragmatic approach to handle such
cases. Before coming to that, however, it  is useful to consider Nagel’s more sophisticated
approach.
3.2 The sophisticated psychological approach 
According to Nagel’s sophisticated approach:
Psychological approach (sophisticated) In HIGH, the subject’s belief is not formed
If we assume, however, that his belief  is formed in these circumstances,  and given
natural psychological assumptions about normal subjects, we should expect his belief
to be ill-based, and therefore unjustified.
If Nagel’s approach is correct, we avoid the problem raised by CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES
SUBJECT. We may hold that the confident high stakes subject (/the attributor) does not know
because  his  belief  is  unjustified.  Therefore,  we  cannot  truly  ascribe  ‘knowledge’  to  this
confident high stakes subject, and we can thus explain why we think that he shouldn’t say ‘I
know’.
It’s  crucial  to  stress  that  the  claim  that  the  high  stakes  subject’s  confident  belief  is
(expectably)  not justified in high stakes cases is not based on the idea that the epistemic
standards for knowledge shift with high stakes. Nagel’s suggestion is rather that perceiving
high stakes (expectably) compromises the possession of evidence, or at least the treatment of
the (otherwise sufficient) available evidence.
In Nagel (2008), the proposal is couched in terms of “need-for-closure”.  Need-for-closure
corresponds to the point where, as Kruglanski and Webster put it, “a belief crystallizes and
turns from hesitant conjecture to a subjectively firm ‘fact’ ”.31  The need-for-closure of an
31 Kruglanski and Webster (1996: 266), quoted by Nagel (2008: 287).
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individual is determined by the integration of various motivational factors affecting his belief-
forming processes to different degrees. Some factors, like pressure of time, cognitive costs, or
perceived tediousness of the cognitive task, raise the need-for-closure. Others, like penalty for
inaccuracy  or  pleasure  taken  in  the  cognitive  activity,  lower  the  need-for-closure.  Some
factors, like haste or distraction, are “accuracy-compromising”: they raise the probability of
being biased. Given that knowledge or epistemic justification requires a well-founded belief,
if  a belief  is  perceived as based on an accuracy-compromising factor,  the subject will  be
perceived as not knowing or not justified.32 In Nagel (2010), the proposal appeals to the notion
of “epistemic anxiety”, where epistemic anxiety is a force or desire for increased cognitive
activity (either in terms of greater amount of evidence or in terms of a more careful treatment
of  the  evidence).33 Likewise,  epistemic  anxiety  can  be  overshadowed  by  accuracy-
compromising factors in such a way that the subject will be perceived as not knowing or not
justified.  The  relation  between  the  notions  of  need-for-closure  and  epistemic  anxiety  is
intricated. For our present purposes, it suffices to emphasize the crucial role that accuracy-
compromising factors play in Nagel’s explanation of most cases.
To begin with, consider HIGH. Like in Bach’s proposal, Nagel’s approach has it that Keith
does not know because he does not confidently believe the target proposition. The stakes are
high. Keith feels strong epistemic anxiety; his need for closure is low.34 His assertion ‘I do not
know that the bank will be open’ is appropriate because it is true.
When  it  comes  to  cases  like  AIRPORT,  Nagel’s  approach  departs  from that  of  Bach in
appealing to the hindsight bias, according to which we have a tendency to mistakenly project
our own doxastic situation onto others.35 Given this bias, Mary erroneously ascribes her low
need-for-closure  or  the  epistemic  anxiety  she  feels  to  Smith  and  she  thereby cannot  see
Smith’s confident belief as justified. Why? Smith’s evidence is relatively weak and, in Mary’s
32 Nagel (2008: 292).
33 Nagel (2010a: 414).
34 Nagel (2008: 289).
35Nagel  (2010a: 425).  We should note that  Nagel considers a slightly different  case,  from DeRose (2009):
suppose that Lena, Thelma and Louise share the same evidence that John was at the office today (and they know
that they share the same evidence). They saw his hat and they heard someone calling him. Now, Thelma at the
tavern  appropriately says  that  Lena  knows that  John was  at  the  office.  However,  when the  police  ask  for
testimony that John was at the office, Louise appropriately says that she and Lena do not know that John was at
the office. Nagel also proposes another possible explanation for the case involving Thelma, Lena and Louise.
When the police ask Louise whether Lena knows, presumably, they are asking about Lena’s capacity to testify.
However, if asked, given the epistemic anxiety she will feel, Lena will probably say that she does not know. That
explains why it is appropriate for Louise to say that Lena does not know, thereby imparting that Lena could not
testify that John was at the office.
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point of view, Smith’s confident belief must be the result of accuracy-compromising factors
raising the need-for-closure or overshadowing his epistemic anxiety. This explains her (false)
assertion that Smith does not know.
Consider now AIRPORT – GOOD EVIDENCE. Here too, we can appeal to the hindsight
bias. If Mary projects her own doxastic situation onto Smith, in Mary’s point of view, Smith
should not have a belief  unless he is under the influence of some accuracy-compromising
factor. This explains Mary’s (false) assertion that Smith does not know.36
Finally, as anticipated above, contrary to Bach’s account, Nagel’s approach is in a position to
offer a diagnosis for cases like CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES SUBJECT. We, the assessors,
are aware that in this situation Keith is aware that the stakes are high. We then ascribe to
Keith a relatively high level of epistemic anxiety or a low need-for-closure and we should not
expect  him  to  have  a  confident  belief,  unless  he  is  under  the  influence  of  accuracy-
compromising factors. If so, Keith does not know, which explains why we judge that it’s
inappropriate for him to say ‘I know that the bank will be open’.
Since Nagel’s account can explain the inappropriateness of Keith’s assertion in CONFIDENT
HIGH STAKES SUBJECT, it seems to fare better than Bach’s proposal. Yet, as I will now
explain, it is vulnerable to specific objections. 
A first problem is the assumption that the presence of accuracy-compromising factors – that
we supposedly need to postulate in order to make sense of the fact that Keith has a confident
belief  in  CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES  SUBJECT–  is  sufficient  to  explain  why  such  a
confident  belief  would  appear  unjustified.  Indeed,  explicitly  mentioning  an  accuracy-
compromising factor sometimes inclines us toward the intuition that the subject knows, or at
least that he can appropriately say that he knows, rather than toward the opposite intuition.
To illustrate, consider a case from Schaffer (2006: 90) that Nagel uses to show that the need-
for-closure (and thus the formation of belief) is affected by various kinds of practical factors:
HIGH  AND  FAST.  On  Friday  afternoon,  Sam is  driving  past  the  bank  with  his
paycheck in his pocket. The lines are long. Sam would prefer to deposit his check
before Monday, and indeed he has pressing financial obligations that require a deposit
before Monday. His entire financial future is at stake. Sam remembers that the bank
was open last Saturday, so he figures that the bank will be open this Saturday. He is
right – the bank will be open. As Sam is about to stop to double-check the bank hours,
36 Nagel (2010a: 426) also uses this strategy to explain our (alleged) intuition in so-called ‘Ignorant High Stakes
cases’, in which the ascriber is aware that the subject faces a high stakes situation, but the latter is ignorant of
that, and where it seems that the ascriber’s ‘knowledge’ denial is appropriate (see Stanley 2005: 5). This case
remains controversial, though (see Gerken 2017: 36).
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he remembers that he promised to buy a present for his wife. She will be furious if he
forgets – his whole relationship is at stake. The stores are about to close. Sam must
choose. So Sam makes a split-second decision to drive past the bank and pick up a
present for his wife instead, thinking that after all, the bank will be open this Saturday.
So, does Sam know that the bank will be open this Saturday?
Nagel (2008: 290) agrees that it seems more appropriate to say that Sam knows if he is short
of time, and her explanation is that in that case Sam confidently believes because his need for
closure is raised by pressure of time. 37  But time pressure is an accuracy-compromising factor
in high stakes situations (at least typically). So if high stakes Keith’s confident belief should
be seen as unjustified why don’t we see high stakes Sam (under pressure of time) as similarly
unjustified? 
Nagel might want to reply that pressure of time does not always compromise accuracy, and
that it does not compromise accuracy in HIGH AND FAST.  But we must then explain why,
when it  comes  to  explaining  high stakes Keith’s  confident  belief  in  CONFIDENT HIGH
STAKES  SUBJECT,  we  (allegedly)  spontaneously  and  implicitly  invoke  an  accuracy-
compromising factor rather than a factor which does not compromise accuracy (like pressure
of time in HIGH AND FAST). After all, postulating an accuracy-compromising factor is less
charitable.
In brief, either we assume that pressure of time is an accuracy-compromising factor also in
HIGH AND FAST, and we must grant that HIGH AND FAST shows that appealing to an
accuracy-compromising factor is insufficient  to explain why we judge that confident high
stakes Keith does not know in CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES SUBJECT. For, in a similar
situation involving Sam, we judge that Sam knows. Or else we assume that pressure of time is
not  an  accuracy-compromising  factor  in  HIGH  AND  FAST,  but  then  it’s  unclear  why
appealing  to  an  accuracy-compromising  factor  is  necessary  to  explain  the  formation  of
Keith’s confident belief in CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES SUBJECT. 
This reveals a second problem for Nagel’s approach. Appealing to accuracy-compromising
factors is not the only possible way to account for the formation of confident beliefs in high
stakes situations. Explanations involving other kinds of factors are possible, and they should
be compatible with the ascription of a justified belief and knowledge. For example, we can
say  that  confident  high  stakes  Keith  is  psychologically  abnormal  and  does  not  feel  the
epistemic anxiety normally related to the perception of high stakes. We can also say that
37 See Nagel (2010a: 291). 
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Keith is practically irrational and does not care about the cost of error.38 In such cases, his
confident belief should be seen as justified.
To see the point, consider what Nagel writes about HIGH:
If we see the wife’s request for additional evidence as rational, [Keith]’s refusal to take
it seriously points to some epistemically problematic disposition in him. (Nagel, 2012,
682)
But,  precisely,  why  would  this  refusal  point  toward  an  “epistemically”  problematic
disposition  (concerning  the  justification  of  belief)  rather  than  a  “practically”  problematic
disposition (concerning the justification of action or assertion)? If Nagel’s approach is meant
to be non-sceptical and conservative, it has to grant that the wife’s request is not epistemically
rational, but merely practically rational. The possibility of error is not an alternative relevant
to knowledge or justified belief.
We can also  imagine  a  different  case,  in  which high stakes  Keith  has  a  confident  belief
without being abnormal or practically irrational. Granted, empirical data suggest that people
do not appeal to the same belief forming process (or method) when the stakes are low and
when they are high. The standard view in psychology of reasoning, to which Nagel appeals,
has it that people typically use two distinct systems or kinds of processes in reasoning. 39 But
we can imagine a high stakes case in which the belief is carefully formed: 40
CAREFUL CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES SUBJECT. The same as HIGH, but Keith
takes his time in assessing the evidence. He discusses with his wife, gives a weight to
each clue and sums up the result in favour or against the belief that the bank will be
open. At the end of the process, Keith acquires a confident belief that the bank will be
open.
The method that Keith uses in this case is much more reliable than the method he is supposed
to use in LOW (it  involves type 2 processing).41 If  the available  evidence is  sufficient  to
know, it should be sufficient for Keith to acquire a confident belief that the bank will be open.
38Nagel  grants  that  insensitivity  to  epistemic  anxiety  can  sometimes  be  explained  in  terms  of  practical
irrationality. For example, she writes: “the underlying reason why we should feel increased epistemic anxiety in
high-stakes circumstances has to do with what is pragmatically desirable: the pragmatic benefits of increased
accuracy offset the pragmatic costs of increased effort and time spent searching for evidence. If the (...) subject
does not feel high anxiety in her current predicament, he is at risk of failing to maximize utility.” (Nagel, 2010a:
427)
39 See Nagel (2010a: 409-412).
40 See also Fantl and McGrath (2009: 44-46).
41 Nagel (2010a: 414) grants that there are two ways of improving our cognition: by acquiring further evidence
or by thinking more thoroughly.
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At  least,  if  Keith  acquires  a  confident  belief,  he  cannot  be  seen  as  being  influenced  by
accuracy-compromising factors (such as haste or distraction).
This point is emphasized by Fantl and McGrath (2009: 46), who correctly conclude that any
conservative philosopher, Nagel included, has to accept the (in their view counterintuitive)
view that in such a case Keith knows. It’s clear, though, that Keith’s assertion that he knows
would seem inappropriate and that he should not act on the target proposition. According to
Fantl and McGrath, that’s because it intuitively still seems that Keith does not know, in spite
of his careful belief formation.
Pace Fantl and McGrath, I side with Nagel (2008: 293; 2010: 422) in thinking that in this case
– in which the subject’s cognitive efforts are fully explained and where it’s clearly postulated
that there are no accuracy-compromising factors – the intuition that the subject does not know
disappears (I will come back to Fantl and McGrath’s objection in more detail in section 4).
But, at least, it’s incumbent on the conservative philosopher to offer a good explanation why
it still seems inappropriate for Keith in such a case to say that he knows (and to act on the
target proposition). Here, we might be tempted to appeal to standard pragmatic approaches,
but we have seen that they are problematic. The challenge of explaining why confident and
careful Keith should not say ‘I know’ remains.
Let us also note that an important consequence of granting that careful and confident high
stakes Keith knows that the bank is open is that we must reject knowledge or justified belief
norms of action and assertion, on pain of having to say that it’s appropriate for Keith in such a
case to act on the proposition that the bank will be open and to flat-out assert (that he knows)
that that bank will be open.42 Nagel’s approach seems much less friendly to knowledge or
justified  belief  norms  than  we  might  have  expected  initially.  (I  will  come  back  to  the
discussion of epistemic norms of assertion and action in section 4.) 
Therefore,  although  Nagel  accepts  that,  intuitively,  the  careful  and confident  high  stakes
subject knows, her approach is not well equipped to explain our intuition to the effect that he
should not act on the target proposition and assert ‘I know that the bank is open’.
In summary,  the main problem of psychological  approaches is  that  they are insufficiently
general.  Bach’s  approach  provides  no  adequate  explanation  for  cases  like  CONFIDENT
42 We might want to argue that careful and confident high stakes Keith is in a position to act on the relevant
proposition without checking. However, given his epistemic position and the cost of error, the claim that careful
and confident high stakes Keith should still check seems particularly difficult to deny (I know no philosopher
denying that claim in print). A more promising strategy is to grant that careful and confident high stakes Keith
should  check  while  trying  to  maintain  that  that  is  compatible  with  knowledge  being  the  norm  of  action.
Williamson  (2005)  is  an  attempt  of  that  sort  invoking  antiluminosity  considerations.  See  Gao  (2019)  for
criticisms.
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HIGH  STAKES  SUBJECT.  Nagel’s  approach  proposes  no  explanation  for  CAREFUL
CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES SUBJECT. In addition, I’ve raised two difficulties specific to
Nagel’s account. First, appealing to accuracy-compromising factors does not seem sufficient
to  explain  why the  belief  under  consideration  should be  seen  as  unjustified.  Second,  it’s
unclear why it’s necessary to appeal to accuracy-compromising factors when we postulate
that the high stakes subject has a confident belief. 
4. Refined Invariantism
We have seen that  non-sceptical  and conservative  approaches  should grant  that  there  are
possible cases in which the high stakes subject has properly formed his belief and knows. Yet,
in these cases, it still seems that the subject should not assert ‘I know’. The psychological
approach offers no explanation here. However, we have also seen that standard pragmatic
approaches  face  important  problems.  In  this  section,  I  propose  a  new  approach  which
supplements the psychological approach with a  non-standard pragmatic approach appealing
to the variability of the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action. I show that
this  combined  approach  is  sufficiently  general  and  that  it  avoids  the  problems  faced  by
standard pragmatic approaches. To present the new approach I want to defend, I will start by a
first-person case, namely, HIGH. I will then clarify how this approach also applies to third-
person cases.
It  has  been stressed,  against  psychological  approaches,  that  it  is  postulated  in  HIGH that
“Keith remains as confident as before”. Advocates of psychological approaches have replied,
to my mind correctly, that if we postulate that Keith remains as confident as before (in the
sense required for knowledge) that makes his assertion of ‘I do not know that the bank is
open’  somewhat  incoherent  or  inappropriate.  As  Bach  (2005:  76)  notes,  when  you  take
yourself as not knowing that p, in general, you are less confident that p than when you take
yourself to know that p.43
It follows that we must distinguish two high stakes cases which are mixed in HIGH. In the
first one (HIGH 1), Keith appropriately asserts ‘I do not know that the bank will be open’. In
HIGH 1, we can explain why Keith’s assertion is appropriate and seems true by granting that
Keith  does  not  remain  as  confident  as  before  and  no  longer  believes  with  sufficient
confidence (that he knows) the proposition. The psychological approach provides an adequate
explanation for this kind of case.
43 See also Nagel (2010a: 421): “in announcing a decision to ‘go in and make sure’, HIGH certainly seems to be
displaying lowered confidence, in some sense of that term.” 
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In the second kind of case (HIGH 2), we postulate that Keith remains as confident as before,
and hence, maintains his confident belief (and his knowledge). What would Keith say? As
Fantl and McGrath (2009: 44) write, if Keith’s confidence is still strong enough for Keith to
be motivated to act, Keith would presumably say something like: “Aw come on, I know [the
bank] will be open. We’ll just come back tomorrow”. However, they continue, “Intuitively,
Keith’s  knowledge-claim,  ‘I  know’ is  false”,  and, of course,  it  is  irrational  to come back
without checking. 
Let me note two things here. First, as said above, if it’s clear that Keith has been careful in
forming his belief, it does not intuitively seem to me that his claim to know is false (although
I agree that it is inappropriate). Second, it’s not clear that postulating that Keith maintains his
confident belief amounts to seeing Keith as still motivated to act and willing to say “I know”
and  “We’ll  just  come  back  tomorrow”.  After  all,  the  same  degree  of  confidence  can  be
sufficient to move someone to act and assert in a low stakes situation and insufficient to move
him to act and assert in a high stakes situation. 
So, I think we should grant that it would be inappropriate for Keith to assert ‘I know’ and to
act on the target proposition,  whether or not Keith maintains his confident belief  (that is,
whether Keith is in HIGH 1 or in HIGH 2). In addition, we should accept, against standard
pragmatic approaches, that if Keith has a confident belief (that he knows), it’s inappropriate
for him to say ‘I do not know’.44 Indeed, this is precisely what underlies the thought that there
is some incoherence in postulating that Keith remains as confident as before in HIGH. For if
Keith remains as confident as before (that he knows), why does he then deny that he knows?
As explained in section 2, it’s hard to see why a lie would be appropriate.45 And if he sincerely
denies that he knows, he is not as confident as before (that he knows), after all.46 However,
44 See Fantl and McGrath (2009: 41).
45 According to Nagel (2010: 422), if in HIGH Keith is careful and confident it could still be “pragmatically 
rational for him to deny that he knows in order to placate his wife”. However, a lie does not seem even 
pragmatically rational, for there is absolutely no need for Keith to lie to placate his wife. He just has to agree that
he should check.
46 See Nagel (2010a: 421). It may seem surprising that we find Keith’s knowledge denial intuitive given that it
is postulated that Keith remains confident in HIGH. But note first that not everybody agree that the knowledge
denial is intuitive. Some precisely think that it is at odd with the supposition that Keith remains as confident as
before. Second, it’s perfectly possible that those who intuitively see Keith’s denial as appropriate implicitely
appeal  to  accuracy-compromising factors  to  make sense  of  Keith’s  confidence,  as  Nagel  suggests.  Third,  I
suspect that when we assess the case, we easily overlook the condition that Keith remains as confident as before
and that we directly focus on whether it is appropriate for Keith to deny that he knows. For, normally, when we
face high stakes, our confidence is shaken. It’s cognitively demanding and somewhat artificial to think of high
stakes Keith as remaining as confident as before.
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note that from the fact that we accept that confident high stakes Keith should not utter ‘I do
not know’ in HIGH 2, it does not follow that we should accept that he can appropriately utter
‘I know’ in HIGH 2. Supposing that Keith justifiably maintains his confident belief, he could
utter for example ‘I definitely think I know, but you’re right, we should make sure’, or ‘I
really think the bank will be open, but you’re right we should check’.
The approach proposed here rejects the wrong dichotomy according to which Keith should
either say that he knows or else that he does not know. This wrong dichotomy sets up the
following fallacious challenge for conservative philosophers: either, if it is assumed that Keith
remains confident and knows in HIGH (implicitly understood as HIGH 2), to explain how it
could be appropriate for Keith to say that he does not know and why that seems true (standard
pragmatic approaches try to met this challenge); or, if it is assumed that Keith’s confidence is
shaken in HIGH (implicitly understood as HIGH 1), to explain why Keith can’t know if the
epistemic  standards  of  knowledge  do not  shift  (psychological  approaches  try  to  met  this
challenge). But it’s clear that we can reject this false dichotomy. If Keith remains confident in
HIGH (i.e. HIGH 2), the diagnosis seems to be that it’s inappropriate for him to say that he
knows, but also inappropriate for him to say that he does not know. 
In a nutshell: 
Refined Invariantism applied to first-person cases. In HIGH, either Keith does not
confidently believe that p (HIGH 1) or he does (HIGH 2). If he does not confidently
believe that p, then it’s appropriate, because true, for him to say ‘I do not know that p’.
If he confidently believes that p, then it’s not appropriate for him to say ‘I do not know
that p’, and it’s not appropriate either for him to say ‘I know that p’. Keith could say
something like ‘I think I know that p, but we should make sure’. This latter assertion is
appropriate because it is true and does not pragmatically convey something false or
inappropriate.
In rejecting the fallacious challenge,  the conservative philosopher can divide and conquer.
The first part of the challenge he now accepts is to explain why it  can be appropriate (and
why it  can seem true) for Keith in HIGH to say that he does not know. This part  of the
challenge is adequately met by psychological approaches (which interpret HIGH as HIGH 1).
The second part of the challenge is to explain why, if it’s postulated that Keith remains as
confident in HIGH (which is to interpret HIGH as HIGH 2), Keith still should not say that he
knows. The second part of the challenge can be met,  I will  now suggest,  if we grant the
independently plausible and well motivated claims that assertions and actions are governed by
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variable  epistemic  standards  and  that  satisfying  knowledge-level  standards  is  not  always
sufficient for appropriate assertions and actions.
The claim that the epistemic appropriateness of assertion or action is somewhat variable is
virtually uncontroversial.47 The claim that knowledge-level standards are not always sufficient
for assertions and actions has been embraced and defended by many philosophers, and this
claim is compatible with many different accounts of the norms of assertion and action.48 In
addition, it is crucial to note that the epistemic standards relevant for appropriate assertions
and  actions  arguably  do  not  all  derive  from  the  (supposed)  epistemic  norms  governing
assertions and actions. In light of this, even prominent advocates of knowledge norms have
granted  that  the  epistemic  standards  of  appropriate  actions  and  assertions  are  somewhat
variable and can sometimes be stronger than knowledge-level standards.49 Paradigmatic cases
where these standards are higher include high stakes cases.
If these claims are correct, we have a simple explanation why, even if it is assumed that high
stakes Keith has a confident belief and knows (HIGH 2), he should not assert (that he knows)
that p and he should not act on p. Indeed, high stakes Keith does not satisfy the epistemic
standards of appropriate assertion and action with regard to the proposition that (he knows
that) the bank will be open. 
The  proposed  explanation  is  not  new.  It  invokes  the  warranted  assertability  manoeuvre
according to which the unassertability of ‘I know p’ in HIGH (HIGH 2) is derived from the
unassertability of ‘p’ and the factivity of knowledge. DeRose (2009: 90) considers explaining
the  bank  cases  in  this  way  and  calls  this  approach  the  ‘Generality  Objection’  to
contextualism.50 Instead  of  putting  the variability  of  the assertability  in  the specific  truth-
conditions  of  ‘knowledge’  ascriptions  and  denial,  the  Generality  Objection  places  this
variability  in  the  general  conditions  for  appropriate  assertion.  The  reason  why  DeRose
ultimately rejects the Generality Objection is that it cannot explain why it seems appropriate
and true for high stakes Keith to say ‘I do not know that the bank is open’. As he puts it, “the
47 See DeRose (2009: 107).
48See, among others, Brown (2008), Levin (2008), Reed (2010), Locke (2015), Gerken (2017). 
49 For  example,  DeRose  (2009)  embraces  (variable)  knowledge  norms  but  he  also  grants  that  secondary
appropriateness requires a reasonable belief that one knows (2009: 93-94). Williamson (2005), who defends
(invariant) knowledge norms, attempts to explain the apparent variability in terms of a general requirement to
know (that  one knows…) that  one satisfies the relevant  norm, where the relevant  level  of iteration is itself
variable. See also Schulz (2018). For a discussion of the distinction between epistemic norms and epistemic
standards, see Fassio (2017).
50 See also Pritchard (2010).
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Generality Objection seems able to handle only our reluctance to claim knowledge, and seems
ill suited to explain why we go so far as to deny that we know” (2009: 111). That’s why, in
the end, we should accept that “there is something special about knowledge” (DeRose 2009:
110).
However, as explained above, we should not think that the Generality Objection fails if it
cannot explain why Keith can appropriately deny that he knows. For if we suppose that Keith
is in HIGH 1, that’s the psychological approach which is supposed to do the explanatory
work. In contrast, if we suppose that Keith is in HIGH 2, it’s not appropriate for Keith to deny
that he knows, and there is nothing to be explained that the Generality Objection fails to
explain.  Thus,  in  this  framework,  DeRose’s  objection  to  the  Generality  Objection  is
undermined. Further, the invoked warranted assertability manoeuvre does not make the truth-
conditions of ‘knoweldge’ ascriptions “special”. In this respect, Refined Invariantism seems
better than Epistemic Contextualism. 
In addition, it pays to note that the fact that it can be appropriate for confident high stakes
Keith to say ‘I think I know’ suggests that revisionary approaches are not only unnecessary to
handle the bank cases, but also dubious. For if it can be appropriate for Keith to say ‘I think I
know’, that means that it’s possible that Keith knows in HIGH. But if revisionary accounts are
right, it should be clear that Keith does not know. The belief that he knows should appear
obviously false, and the assertion ‘I think I know’ inappropriate.
We have seen how first-person cases can be explained either by a psychological approach or
by a non-standard pragmatic approach, depending on whether we postulate that the subject
carefully believes  (in the sense required by knowledge) the target  proposition in the high
stakes situation. Let’s now turn to the consideration of third-person cases. 
Here,  again,  we can appeal to a psychological  approach or to the non-standard pragmatic
approach  presented  above,  depending  on  the  details  of  the  case.  We  have  seen  that  a
psychological  approach is  well  designed to explain third-person cases like AIRPORT and
AIRPORT-GOOD EVIDENCE. In third-person cases of that sort the ascriber does not believe
the target proposition or he believes the target proposition but he does not believe that the
subject’s belief satisfies the epistemic standards for knowledge. The reason for that is that the
ascriber is wrong, or biased, about the epistemic standards required for knowledge. Given this
comprehensible mistake, it is appropriate for the ascriber to deny knowledge to the subject,
although  the  subject  actually  knows.  Refined  Invariantism  accepts  the  psychological
explanation for such cases.
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However, we have also seen that psychological approaches face a challenge when it comes to
explaining third-person cases like CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES SUBJECT and CAREFUL
CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES SUBJECT. In both of these cases,  it  is  stipulated that  the
ascriber believes that the high stakes subject believes  (in the sense required to know) the
target proposition. It is also clearly stipulated in both cases that the ascriber is not biased and
believes that the available evidence is good enough for knowledge. It is furthermore clearly
stipulated in the latter case that the subject correctly bases his belief on the available evidence
and that the ascriber does not think that the subject mistreats the evidence in question. 
In  these  two  cases,  as  explained  in  the  previous  section,  it  still  seems  that  it  would  be
inappropriate  for the subject to overtly self-ascribe ‘knowledge’.  To explain that,  Refined
Invariantism appeals  to  the  non-standard  pragmatic  approach:  the  epistemic  standards  of
assertion  are  raised  by  the  presence  of  high  stakes,  which  explains  why  it  would  be
inappropriate for the subject to assert (that he knows) the target proposition. And given that
the  subject  is  supposed to  confidently  believe  (in  the  sense required  to  know)  the  target
proposition,  it  also seems inappropriate  for him to self-deny ‘knowledge’.  What  we have
suggested is that it would be appropriate for a subject in such circumstances to say “I think I
know but I should make sure” or something along these lines. 
Consider  now the  third-person ascriber.  Given that  the  ascriber  is  aware  that  the  subject
confidently believes (in the sense required for knowledge) the target proposition on the basis
of evidence sufficient to know and that the evidence is not mistreated, Refined Invariantism
predicts that he could appropriately ascribe ‘knowledge’ to this subject. Crucially, that seems
to be the right verdict. Again, following Nagel, if it is clearly stipulated that high stakes Keith
believes on the basis of the available evidence and careful reflection that the bank will be
open, the intuition that he does not know disappears and it’s very unclear that it would be
inappropriate  to  ascribe  ‘knowledge’  to him.  However,  as  explained above,  that  does  not
imply that the third-person ascriber should grant that Keith should not check or should assert
that he knows. To repeat, a third-person ascriber could appropriately say “Keith knows, but he
should make sure” or something like that.
In a nutshell: 
Refined Invariantism applied to third-person cases.  Either  the ascriber does not
believe the target proposition and/or (incorrectly) takes the subject not to believe the
target  proposition  or  to  believe  it  in  a  wrong way --  for  example  on the  basis  of
evidence insufficient to know (e.g. AIRPORT, AIRPORT- GOOD EVIDENCE) or in
mistreating the evidence (e.g. CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES SUBJECT); or it is clear
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to the ascriber that the subject believes the target proposition (in the sense required for
knowledge)  and  does  not  mistreat  the  available  evidence  (e.g.  CAREFUL
CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES SUBJECT). In the first case, it is appropriate (although
perhaps false) for the ascriber to deny ‘knowledge’ to the subject. In the second case, it
is appropriate (and true) for the ascriber to ascribe ‘knowledge’ to the subject.
Thus, Refined Invariantism proposes to use a psychological approach to treat the third-person
cases  in  which  this  approach does  well,  but  it  proposes  to  use a  non-standard  pragmatic
approach to treat the third-person cases in which the psychological approach fails.51 
To finish, let me highlight the virtues of Refined Invariantism. Refined Invariantism avoids
the five pressing problems faced by standard pragmatic  approaches.  To see this,  consider
HIGH. First, if we interpret HIGH as HIGH 1, it is granted that Keith’s denial is true. That’s
why what Keith says – ‘I do not know’ – seems appropriate and true (claims 1 and 3). In
addition, Keith’s ‘knowledge’ ascription is false. That’s why it seems inappropriate and false
for  him to  self-ascribe  ‘knoweldge’  (claims  2 and 4).  At  the  same time,  as  noted,  some
(conservative) philosophers have the intuition that in HIGH Keith knows (they reject claims 3
and 4). Presumably,  they interpret HIGH as HIGH 2. In such a case, Refined Invariantism
grants that Keith’s ‘knowledge’ denial is false. We can thus easily explain why, in that case,
as  some  philosophers  have  it,  Keith’s  ‘knowledge’  denial  seems  false  and  Keith’s
‘knowledge’ ascription seems true. And, of course it would be inappropriate for Keith to deny
‘knowledge’ in that case, for that’s false.52 It would also be inappropriate for Keith to ascribe
‘knowledge’, for the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion are too high in this context.
As a result, the apparent truth-value problem is avoided, for there is no assumption here that
true implicatures can make literally false assertions appear true or false implicatures can make
literally true assertions appear false.
Second, Refined Invariantism avoids the inappropriate falsehood problem, for the proposed
explanation does not need to assume that asserting a falsehood can be appropriate. 
51 For example, consider the case of Louise being asked by the Police whether Lena knows that John was at the
office (footnote 35). It is crucial to be explicit about whether Louise remains as confident as before. If Louise
does not remain as confident, the psychological explanation is adequate. If Louise remains as confident and if
it’s also clear that Louise’s confidence is not affected by a bias then it becomes unclear that she does not know
and that she could appropriately say that she or Lena does not know. However, it still seems that Louise cannot
appropriately assert that she or Lena knows. This is explained by the non-standard pragmatic approach.  
52 Note that  some revisionary philosophers agree that if Keith believes (that he knows) the proposition, he
should not say ‘I do not know’ (e.g. Fantl and McGrath 2009: 41).
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Third, we can also see the retraction problem in a different light. Suppose that in the new high
stakes context under consideration, Keith’s confidence is shaken. This makes the new context
a case of HIGH 1. Keith’s retraction is then easily explained by the psychological approach.
Keith’s  threshold  for  believing  is  raised  and,  like  John  and  Mary  assessing  Smith  in
AIRPORT, Keith (falsely) judges that he did not know. On the other hand, suppose that, in
the new high stakes context, Keith maintains his confident belief. This makes the new context
a case of HIGH 2. In that case, the retraction no longer seems appropriate.53
Fourth,  given  that  Refined  Invariantism  appeals  to  a  warranted  assertability  manoeuvre
invoking the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action, there is no cancelation
problem. Indeed, there is no expectation that what is represented by the assertion – namely
that  the  epistemic  standards  of  assertion  are  satisfied  –  should  be  cancelable  without
incoherence. As is familiar, utterances of Moorean sentences – like ‘p but I do not believe that
p’ or ‘p but I do not know that p’ – sound incoherent for the following pragmatic reason. By
asserting ‘p’ you represent yourself as satisfying  the relevant epistemic standards with respect
to p for properly asserting ‘p’, and by asserting ‘I do not believe that p’ or ‘I do not know that
p’, you represent yourself as not satisfying these standards. But it’s incoherent to represent
yourself  as  satisfying  these  standards  and not  satisfying  them.  Hence the  uncancelability:
either your assertion that p is inappropriate or your assertion that you do not believe or know
that p is false and therefore inappropriate. Anyway, there is something inappropriate. In the
framework developed here, similar considerations can be used to explain why an utterance of
‘I  know that  the bank is  open but I  should check’  by Keith in HIGH is bound to sound
incoherent, even if it’s true that Keith knows and should check.54 Suppose that Keith does not
satisfy the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion that (he knows that) the bank is open
in  this  high  stakes  context,  so  that  he  should  check  before  asserting.  Therefore,  it’s
inappropriate for him to assert ‘(I know that) the bank is open’. Suppose it’s epistemically
appropriate for him to assert this proposition. His assertion ‘I should check’ is false. Hence,
the feeling of incoherence.
53 As Dimmock and Huvenes (2014) note, it should not be assumed that Keith’s “only option is to retract his
previous assertion. There might well be more than one appropriate response available to [Keith]. All that we are
assuming is that if [Keith] were to retract his previous assertion and admit that he said something false, that
would be a natural and appropriate response.” I agree, for it’s natural for Keith to lose confidence, and thereby
knowledge, when he perceives that the stakes are high. In such a case, he cannot anymore ascribe ‘knowledge’ of
the proposition to anyone. But we should not exclude cases in which Keith remains as confident as before, where
a different response would be appropriate.
54 See Stanley (2008) for a similar manoeuvre regarding the incoherence involved in utterances of ‘I know that
p but I’m not certain that p / it’s not certain that p’.
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Last, it’s clear that by invoking the variability of assertability conditions we are invoking a
general  phenomenon  not  specific  to  ‘knowledge’  ascriptions  and  denials.  Refined
Invariantism invokes a general rule, and it does not run the risk of being ad hoc. 
Consider now the problems faced by psychological approaches. Their main problem is that
they are insufficiently general. Bach’s approach is insufficient to account for CONFIDENT
HIGH  STAKES  SUBJECT  and  Nagel’s  approach  (besides  some  other  difficulties)  is
insufficient  to account  for CAREFUL CONFIDENT HIGH STAKES SUBJECT. In these
cases,  the  high  stakes  subject  is  seen  as  having  a  confident  belief  based  on  evidence
supposedly sufficient  to know, and yet  he should not say ‘I know’. By invoking variable
epistemic standards governing appropriate assertions, Refined Invarantism offers the needed
explanation. In addition, Refined Invariantism is compatible with Nagel’s contention that in
some (or many) cases we see the high stakes confident subject’s belief as unjustified because
we see his belief as formed on the basis of accuracy-compromising factors. However, Refined
Invariantism does not assume that this provides a necessary or sufficient explanation for what
can happen in cases like the bank cases. 
6. Conclusion
A certain number of cases presented in the literature highlight that our willingness to ascribe
or deny ‘knowledge’ can shift with the stakes. While revisionary approaches have argued that
that should be explained by the surprising assumption that the truth-value of these ascriptions
and denials shifts with practical factors, conservative approaches have tried to invoke more
traditional  assumptions:  that  ‘knowledge’  ascriptions  and  denials  have  pragmatic
implicatures, or that the perception of high stakes can affect the belief forming process. I have
explained why these conservative approaches are ultimately unsatisfactory. I have proposed a
third conservative approach instead – Refined Invariantism – which combines a psychological
approach  with  a  different  pragmatic  approach  appealing  to  the  epistemic  standards  of
appropriate assertions and actions. I have shown why Refined Invariantism fares better than
its rival conservative approaches.55
55 A previous version of this paper was presented at the conference “Knowledge, Belief and Probability” in 
Hamburg in 2018. I would like to thank in particular M. Schulz, P. Rich, J. Koscholke, R Heil, F. Teroni and 
A. Logins for very helpful discussion. The work on this paper was supported by the SNSF research project 
‘Rationality and Reflection’ (grant number 178039). 
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